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David Broadland

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Wildflower families of the Discovery Islands

Forest-related journalism

Ocean-related reporting

Primary forest survey: Quadra Island

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (white-coloured wildflowers)

Loss of forest cover on Quadra Island

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (yellow-coloured wildflowers)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (pink-coloured wildflowers)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Blue-flowered wildflowers)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Red-orange-flowered wildflowers)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (brown-coloured wildflowers)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (purple-coloured wildflowers)

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Marine mammals

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Land mammals

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Marine birds

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Forest birds

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Amphibians

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Reptiles

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Marine Invertebrates

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Fish

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Green-flowered wildflowers)

Logging in the watersheds of Quadra Island

Plant species observed on the Discovery Islands that are endangered, threatened or species of concern

Animal species observed on the Discovery Islands that are endangered, threatened or species of concern

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Trees and Shrubs)

Lichen species of the Discovery Islands

Primary forest survey: Read Island

Primary forest survey: Cortes Island

Primary forest survey: Maurelle Island

Primary forest survey: Sonora Island

Primary forest survey: West Redonda Island

Primary forest survey: smaller islands

Primary forest survey: East Redonda Island

Place names: Quadra Island

Place names: Cortes Island

Place names: Read Island

Place names: Maurelle Island

Place names: Sonora Island

Place names: West Redonda Island

Place names: East Redonda Island

Place names: smaller islands

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Grasses, sedges & rushes)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Aquatics)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Ferns)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Lichens)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Fungi)

Plant species of the Discovery Islands (Mosses and Liverworts)

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Butterflies, Skippers and Moths

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Dragonflies and Damselflies

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Bees, Ants and Wasps

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Beetles

Animal species of the Discovery Islands: Slugs and Snails

Loss of forest cover on Read Island

Loss of forest cover on Cortes Island

Loss of forest cover on Maurelle Island

Loss of forest cover on Sonora Island

Loss of forest cover on West Redonda Island

Loss of forest cover on East Redonda Island

Solutions

Photographic survey

Forest carbon release by logging on the Discovery Islands

Portal: Public subsidization of logging on the Discovery Islands

Loss of forest cover on the Discovery Islands

The cost of the public subsidy of clearcut logging on the Discovery Islands

Impact of clearcut logging on forest-related employment

Loss of forest carbon sequestration capacity due to logging

Forest stewardship plans for area-based forest tenures on the Discovery Islands

History of forest loss on the Discovery Islands

Portal: A paradigm shift in how Discovery Islands forests are managed is urgently needed

Portal: Over-exploitation of BC forests

Portal: Imagining a new relationship with forests

Portal: Loss of primary forest

Portal: Destruction of wildlife habitat and loss of biodiversity

Portal: Loss of the hydrological functions of forests

Portal: Increase in forest fire hazard

Portal: Loss of carbon sequestration capacity

Portal: Increase in forest carbon emissions

Portal: Plantation failure

Portal: Use of ecologically damaging practices

Portal: Permanent loss of forest to logging roads, landings and quarries

Portal: Soil loss and damage

Portal: Loss of forest-related employment

Portal: Loss of employment resulting from the export of raw logs

Portal: Costs of floods, fires and clearcutting of community watersheds

Portal: The economic impact on communities of boom and bust cycles

Portal: The instability of communities dependent on forest extraction

Portal: Psychological unease caused by forest destruction

Portal: Loss of trust in institutions as a result of over-exploitation of forests

Portal: Social division caused by over-exploitation of BC forests

Portal: Loss of economic potential of other forest-related sectors

Portal: The economic cost of converting forests into sawdust and wood chips

Portal: The need to reform BC forest legislation

Portal: The need to expedite treaties with First Nations

Portal: The need to get informed, organized and ready for change

Portal: Surveys

Portal: The case for much greater conservation of forests on the Discovery Islands

Portal: Greater conservation of forests is needed to mitigate climate change

Portal: Retention of old and mature forest is necessary to protect biodiversity

Portal: Compared with old and mature forest, logged areas have a higher fire hazard

Portal: The extraordinary beauty of the Discovery Islands needs to be protected

Portal: We support Indigenous title and rights on the Discovery Islands

Portal: Logging on the Discovery Islands is heavily subsidized by the public

Species at risk on the Discovery Islands

Historical record of forest fires on the Discovery Islands

Lakes and wetlands of the Discovery Islands

Recreation Resources: Morte Lake-Chinese Mountain area

Recreation Resources: Nugedzi Lake-Mount Seymour area

Recreation Resources: Newton Lake-Small Inlet-Waiatt Bay area

Recreation Resources: Mud Lake-Nighthawk Lake area

Recreation Resources: Eagle Ridge-Blindman's Bluff area

Recreation Resources: Heriot Ridge area

Recreation Resources: Shellalligan Pass area

Recreation Resources: Two-Mile Lake-Clear Lake-Hummingbird Lake area

Recreation Resources: Maud Island-Saltwater Lagoon

Recreation Resources: Hyacinthe Point area

Recreation Resources: Raven Lake-Raven Ridge area

Recreation Resources: Main Lake Provincial Park

Recreation Resources: Octopus Islands Provincial Park

Recreation Resources: Darkwater Lake-Darkwater Mountain

Salmon bearing streams

Portal map: Salmon bearing streams of the Discovery Islands

Library: Logging and plantations create higher forest fire hazard

Libary: Conservation of forests needed to protect biodiversity

Library: Conservation of forests is needed to mitigate climate change

Library: Supporting Indigenous title and rights

Central library

Portal: Discovery Islands' place names

Export of raw logs from the Discovery Islands

Log exports from the Discovery Islands

Discovery Islands forest tenures and logging plans

Discovery Islands Protected Areas

Place names of the Discovery Islands

Portal: Calculation of direct local employment

Watersheds of Quadra Island

Watersheds of Read Island

Watersheds of Cortes Island

Watersheds of Maurelle Island

Watersheds of Sonora Island

Portal: Watersheds of the Discovery Islands

Engaging the mindustry

Species at risk of local extirpation

Artistic Expression

Volunteer

Discussion

Project calculations

Definitions

Fisheries surveys of Discovery Islands creeks

Portal: Resolution of forest-use conflicts

Vancouver Island Land Use Plan

About the Discovery Islands Conservation Project

Recent satellite imagery of forest cover loss on the Discovery Islands

Forest planning documents

Sources for April 2023 complaint to Forest Practices Board

Woodlot 2031 (Okisollo Resources)

Herbicide use

DI Forest Bulletin

Sources for 2024 submission on TFL 47 Johnstone Strait FSP

Comments on proposed cutblocks and roads

Blogs

Events

Downloads

Everything posted by David Broadland

  1. I FIRST WROTE THIS INTRODUCTION in mid-2020: After Veridian Ecological produced BC’s Old-Growth Forest: A Last Stand for Biodiversity, but before Gorley and Merkel’s A New Future For Old Forests; before the Ministry responded to Gorley and Merkel with a set of deceptive deferrals that changed almost nothing but helped an NDP-led government get re-elected; before the Fairy Creek blockades turned into Canada’s largest ever act of mass civil disobedience; before a second panel was assembled to review old growth; before the ministry announced 2-year deferrals on 2.6 million hectares of old forest—subject to First Nations’ approval within 30 days—and before Grand Chief Stewart Phillip chided the Horgan government for using coercion to get First Nation approval for those 2.6 million hectares. By the time you have finished reading this sentence, the situation may have changed again, and I will be re-writing this introduction. That is to say, the struggle to protect as much remaining primary forest as possible has heated up, is fluid, and the momentum in the battle does not appear to be on the side of the logging industry. But who really knows? In going from mid-2020 to late 2021, the extent of primary forest that scientists and conservationists say should be taken out of the 22-million-hectare Timber Harvesting Land Base has grown. In mid-2020, the concern was for primary forest that contained “large” or “very large” old trees. Forest scientists Karen Price and Rachel Holt, along with forester Dave Daust, had estimated that an area of only 415,000 hectares of such forest remains in BC. Price, Holt and Daust, along with Gary Merkel and Lisa Matthaus were appointed to a Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) by forests minister Katrine Conroy earlier in 2021, and now their focus has shifted to 7.6 million hectares of “Big Tree Old Growth,” “Ancient Old Growth” and “Rare Old Growth.” Of that 7.6 million hectares, 5 million hectares is unprotected. The ministry of forests, advised by TAP, has prioritized 2-year logging deferrals on 2.6 million of those 5 million unprotected hectares. TAP’s recommendations were based on ministry records indicating where primary forests remain and the risk that logging could occur in those areas in the next two years. It is too early to say whether the ministry is genuinely considering deferring logging on 2.6 million hectares of at-risk primary forest. Given its record of deception on the deferrals it announced in mid-2020 before the provincial election, there’s good reason to be skeptical. It might be the case that the bad publicity from the Fairy Creek blockades has forced the ministry to devise a communications plan that proposes a course of action that sounds good on CBC and makes the public think the issue has been settled, but that the ministry has no actual intention of following. We’ve seen that before. Nor is it clear what a “deferral area” means to the ministry of forests. At the November 2 press briefing before the announcement of the 2.6-million-hectare priority deferral areas, the assistant deputy minister of forests was asked by a reporter: “In the past, old-growth deferral areas still allowed for logging of second growth, cutting new forestry roads, that type of thing. People saw some major activity in and around some major trees. Is that still allowed here? Is it still allowed to have activity in deferral areas, logging in and around the rare and ancient trees?” David Muter didn’t say “no,” and instead referred to the deferral areas announced a year before where, he admitted, logging has been, and will continue to be, allowed. When asked about this the day after, Muter still didn’t clarify whether logging would be allowed. If the ministry has a genuine commitment to fully protect these areas of primary forest and logging is not going to be permitted, surely he would have said so. We asked Rachel Holt if leaving old trees in the deferral areas while removing younger but merchantable trees would serve the purpose of protecting biodiversity—one of the key concerns about loss of primary forest. Holt simply responded: “No.” The grounds for skepticism about the government’s intentions don’t stop there. The priority deferral areas, the ministry stipulated, required approval by First Nations. Indigenous governments were given only 30 days to make that decision. First Nations were promised some money to help them with the work of determining what impact the deferrals would have on them, but apparently no such support materialized. Further, accurate mapping of the deferral areas, essential for First Nations to know what it was they were being asked to make a decision about, wasn’t provided. On the 29th day of the 30-day decision period, the president of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, Grand Chief Phillip Stewart, expressed concern about the government’s intention. “Let’s be clear,” Stewart said, “What we want is a moratorium on old-growth logging. Period. We don’t want some convoluted, concocted, deceitful notion of deferrals, of kicking the ball down the road and allowing the industrialized devastation of logging in British Columbia to continue.” So it’s difficult to know at this date (December, 2021) whether the deferral announcements are a step in the direction of the “paradigm shift” called for by Gorley and Merkel in their report, or just a devious communications plan created by the ministry to make business-as-usual look like a resolution to the question of how much of BC’s remaining primary forest will be allowed to be converted to plantations. To make things even more complicated, all of the numbers and descriptions about how much area of primary forest remains—and what’s in them—that were used by the Technical Advisory Panel are all guesses based on databases that everyone admits are badly flawed. Over the years, the ministry of forests just hasn’t done the work necessary—ground-truthing—to be able to say how much primary forest is left, where it is and what’s in it. One thing that is clear, especially following the mid-November flooding of Merritt, Princeton and the Fraser River Valley, as well as the widespread damage to highway infrastructure: For conservationists, the “old growth” goal has expanded from protecting the remaining forest that contains large old trees to protecting all remaining unprotected primary forest. The Discovery Islands Forest Conservation Project will follow and report on this story as it unfolds. But we are going to go further than that. We see the need for the case to be made for protecting all remaining primary forest. We will help to make that case. But so far, all the back and forth between government and industry and the conservation side about how much primary forest is left in BC—and where it is—has been based on computer models that have not been ground-truthed. Lines need to be drawn on maps—lines that are informed by actually knowing what’s inside the lines. Government hasn’t done this work and the question is: What will it take for the ministry of forests to do the work of determining where primary forest still exists and, where it exists, what’s in it?
  2. BC logging companies export 80 percent of the products made from our forests. As a result, BC’s record of forest loss, per capita, is worse than Bolivia’s and far worse than Brazil’s. This rate of forest loss, made worse by losses to insects, forest fires and disease, is neither sustainable nor ethical. WHILE MANY British Columbians loathe clearcut logging—especially clearcut logging of old-growth forests, these are mere symptoms of a much bigger problem: the over-exploitation of BC forests. Over the last 20 years, industrial logging of live, healthy trees has destroyed more forest than the Mountain Pine Beetle, disease and forest fires combined. This has created a remarkable outcome. Among the ten most-forested states on Earth, BC has the highest per capita rate of forest cover loss. This is a measure of how completely BC’s logging industry has seized control of publicly-owned forests. BC experienced an immense amount of forest loss as a result of the beetle infestation over those 20 years. It also experienced significant growth in the size and intensity of forest fires. Yes, nature has taken its toll on our forests, especially under the influence of human-created climate change. But those natural forces are at work in those other countries, too, so BC’s record can’t be excused by blaming it on nature. In fact, if we take the forest loss due to natural causes out of the numbers for BC and leave them in for all the other countries, BC still has the worst record of forest loss on planet Earth: So why is this vast forest removal project occurring? Let’s consider the rationale offered by the proponents of primary forest liquidation and then come back to why it’s really happening. Industry and government in BC often cite a purely economic rationale for why we should use our forests to the extent we do: We need employment, building materials, foreign currency and government revenue. But if forest removal in BC was occurring at a rate necessary to meet those needs, the rate of removal per capita would align with other countries with similar economic needs, like the USA. Instead, BC’s per capita rate of forest loss is much, much higher than the USA’s. In fact, comparison of BC’s per capita forest removal with heavily forested but economically poorer states around the planet leads to the inevitable conclusion that something in BC has gone very haywire over the past 20-30 years. Consider Bolivia. It’s the 8th most heavily forested country in the world. It has an area of 1.099 million square kilometres, just slightly larger than BC’s 944,735. Between 2001 and 2019, Bolivia lost 5.68 million hectares of forest as a result of logging, fire, disease and insect infestation. In that same period, BC lost 7.88 million hectares to all causes. During those 20 years, Bolivia’s average population was 10.4 million, BC’s was 4.74 million. When you do the arithmetic, Bolivia’s forest loss from all causes over those 20 years amounted to .545 hectares per capita. BC lost 1.66 hectares per capita, more than three times Bolivia’s loss. Yet Bolivia is considered an international pariah when it comes to forest loss. While government and industry claim that the rate of forest removal in BC is as high as it is because it’s necessary to feed forestry families, there’s little evidence that this is actually the case. Protest against forest conservation by the BC Truck Loggers Association in Victoria (Photo: Global TV) Between BC and Bolivia, there’s no question about which country has the greatest economic need to exploit its forests. In 2010, the mid-point of the 20-year period we’re considering, Bolivia’s per capita GDP was around $1900 per person. BC’s was $41,327. In other words, Bolivia had a much greater economic need, per capita, to exploit its forest resource than BC did. Yet BC’s per capita rate of forest loss was over three times as high as Bolivia’s. Keep in mind that BC’s high per capita GDP had little to do with the forest industry, which in 2010 accounted for only about 2.5 percent of BC’s GDP, according to the BC government. By 2019, that had fallen to 1.8 percent. So the “we need to feed our families” rationale for why BC needs to devastate its primary forests is completely bogus, a fiction used by the industry to divert the attention of BC’s TV and newsprint journalists away from the world-class clearcuts. The employment rationale is undermined by the facts, too. Direct jobs in the forest industry were cut in half during the 20-year period we’re considering, yet the area of forest removed in a year may have fluctuated in response to market conditions but is slightly higher now than 20 years ago when there were twice as many people working in the industry. Moreover, the fraction of total employment contributed by the forest industry to BC’s economy got smaller and smaller. In other words, contrary to what they say, there is no commitment by government or industry to link the extent of forest removal with employment. Logging industry supporters point to BC’s need for foreign currency as justification for the high level of forest removal. This is almost laughable, especially when we consider how BC is marketed to the international tourism market: Super, Natural BC. Tourism is a bigger industry in BC than the forest products industry, and international tourism brings foreign currency directly to BC. Those tourists don’t come to see clearcuts, they come for BC’s purported scenic beauty and wildlife, both of which are being threatened by the extent of logging. If BC needed more foreign currency, it would be more effective to attract more tourists, not create the conditions that will drive them away. Government revenue? There is no net revenue for government from the forest industry. Once you include the huge hidden cost of direct public subsidies involved, there is a huge net loss to the public purse, a cost that is greater then the industry’s contribution to provincial GDP. Finally, what about BC’s need for wood products, like dimensional lumber and toilet paper? Since 80 percent of the wood products made from forest removal in BC over the last 20 years were exported to other countries, there is no justification for the claim that forest removal is as high as it is because BC needs the wood products for its own use. And it is that very high level of exports that is the underlying cause of the over-exploitation of BC forests. Only 20 percent of the forest logged in BC is used to meet BC’s needs. The rest is exported, mainly to the USA, China and Japan. It is noteworthy that those three countries now have much higher levels of protection for their own primary forests than BC does. China banned all logging of its primary forests in 2020. In the US Pacific Northwest, where forests are comparable to BC’s, clearcut logging in old-growth forests on public land was ended in the 1990s. The Biden administration recently ended clearcutting of old-growth forest in the Tongass National Forest in Alaska. A survey of satellite images of Japanese forests shows little to no clearcutting is taking place in that country. It’s also noteworthy that China and the USA are two of the world’s largest exporters of wood products. They import wood from BC, remanufacture it to a higher value and then sell it to other countries. Teal Cedar Products, for example, has a mill in Surrey that produces rough lumber. It then ships that lumber across the border to its remanufacturing facility in Sumas, Washington and adds value to it there. While export markets are the main driver of primary forest removal in BC, it is the policies of the forests ministry—which, to put it bluntly, have been written by the logging industry—that allows such a vast over-engagement with that market. Large companies, through the Council of Forest Industries, have effectively executed a regulatory capture of the provincial forests ministry and de facto privatization of BC’s purportedly “publicly owned” forests. That story is covered elsewhere on this site. The resulting over-exploitation of BC’s forests is now highly evident in satellite images of almost every landscape across the province. To experience this destruction on the ground can be both shocking and motivating. Satellite image of BC above Paradise Lake near Peachland Clearcut near Peachland. On the ground, the physical size of the clearcuts permitted by the ministry of forests is shocking. (Photo by Will Koop) Our purpose in this section of the site is to develop an understanding of how much of BC’s allowable annual cut could be eliminated in order to conserve forests as a response to the climate and biodiversity crises, and how much of the cut would need to be given up just to bring BC in line with less extreme members of the global community, like Bolivia and Brazil. BC has, basically, three options. The first is to ignore the fact that it is, by global standards, over-exploiting its forests and will soon be seen, in this era of climate emergency and biodiversity collapse, as an international pariah, like Brazil and Bolivia, only worse. Making sure international customers are aware of what’s happening in BC will be essential if the ministry continues to be unresponsive to the unfolding climate and biodiversity crises in BC. The second option is to reduce the cut so that it just meets our own needs and no more. Let the USA, China and Japan figure out how to meet their own needs without using BC as a sacrifice zone. The third option would be to make a paradigm shift to ecosystem-based forest management, where “extraction of timber” would only occur at a level that didn’t degrade ecosystems. In that case, we would need to adjust our “need” to what’s actually available without harming our life support system. Those of us who have a conviction that all this forest destruction is unsustainable and harming humanity’s future on Earth need to act. The forest destruction that’s occurring just to feed the export market is a huge target begging for action. The current government, advised by industry and ministry of forests personnel who relate to forests in terms of “fibre” and “feedstock,” seems unaware that BC has fallen so far into industrial extremism. Our challenge will be to wake them up and get them moving in the right direction.
  3. Currently, publicly owned forests on the islands are managed for the economic gain of a small number of people. The essential ecological services provided by these forests are largely ignored. THE MILD, WET CLIMATE of the Discovery Islands has, in the past, produced lush forests containing large, long-lived trees that stored immense quantities of carbon and supported unusually large numbers of forest-dependent plants and animals. The evidence for this can still be found in scattered groves of old-growth forest around these islands, and in the huge, decomposing stumps left behind by early hand loggers. Where the groves remain, you can find plants and animals that can’t be found anywhere else. These remnants of primordal forest contain critically important characteristics that current circumstances—namely the collapse in biodiversity and growing climate instability—demand be conserved and more broadly restored across the islands. But the forests of the Discovery Islands are being treated just like any other forest in BC: as a “natural resource” that can be used for the generation of private wealth, no matter what the long-term impacts may be. This private seizure and destruction of an essential common life support system has long been characterized by those benefitting from the seizure as “in the public interest”: logging pays the bills of government, is essential to the province’s economic growth and is “sustainable,” they claim. But our so-called “publicly owned” forests are not being cut down to “pay the bills” for government services. The cost of running the ministry of forests between 2010 and 2019 exceeded all forest-related revenues by an average of nearly $1 million per day. Nor are BC forests being logged to meet British Columbia’s own need for wood products. Between 80 and 90 percent of the wood products obtained from BC forests are exported, mainly to the USA, China and Japan. Essential ecological services provided by forests have been legislated into oblivion by the “unduly” clauses in regulations governing logging of BC forests. No matter what beneficial services forests provide—habitat for fish and wildlife, protection of biodiversity, regulation of water quality, temperature and flow, and so on—current legislation protects those services “only to the extent that it does not unduly reduce the supply of timber from British Columbia’s forests.” Any private economic benefit derived from logging comes at the cost of hidden losses: Loss of stable, unfragmented wildlife habitat; loss of the capacity of forests to provide climate stability, loss of the hydrologic functions of mature and old forests, including filtering and moderating the temperature of salmon bearing streams; and loss of low fire hazard. The resulting widespread over-exploitation of BC forests, including those on the Discovery Islands, provides few economic opportunities for ordinary British Columbians. Once an important part of BC’s early economic development, the now-highly-mechanized industry has lost 50 percent of its workforce in just the last 20 years and now contributes less than 2 percent of the province’s GDP. The industry has become a noose around taxpayers’ collective neck, constantly pulled tighter by the influence of industry insiders who pass through the revolving door between the Council of Forest Industries and deputy ministerial postings. The industry is simply not economically viable without taxpayer support. The tenuous economic nature of the industry is illustrated by a claim made by Mosaic Forest Management, the logging company doing the greatest damage on the Discovery Islands. In 2020, according to Globe and Mail reporter Justine Hunter, the company’s Chief Forester Domenico Iannidinardo claimed that “the company’s cost of harvesting usually exceeds what local mills are paying for logs.” Mosaic made that claim as it pressured the federal government to remove all restrictions on the export of raw, unprocessed logs to overseas markets. Mosaic Forest Management owns no mills of its own in BC and is the largest exporter of raw logs. Destroying forests for raw log export may keep a few local road builders, fallers, truckers and a handful of professional foresters employed, but their employment is highly subsidized by both BC taxpayers and nature. It is a common experience that personal submissions to the ministry of forests or the logging companies—from people concerned about the myriad impacts on their community of logging for the export market—have little or no effect, no matter how well-considered they are. De facto privatization of BC’s publicly owned forests in 2003 transferred the obligation to ignore public concerns from government to industry. Since then, the main role of the forest ministry has been to create the conditions that keep wood exports flowing to the US, China and Japan, at as high a rate as the market allows. Even when other government agencies have tried to limit the amount of logging on the islands—for example, by the establishment of Special Management Zone 19 on Quadra Island by the 2001 Vancouver Island Land Use Plan’s Higher Level Order—the Ministry of Forests has undermined the effort and reasserted its own control over the extent of logging on Quadra. The ministry operates as though one set of forest policies fits every part of the province equally. And those policies have been designed for one purpose: to allow an aggressive liquidation of BC’s mature and primary forests in order to meet the export market for wood products and generate private wealth. But differences in geography, wildlife occurrence, human population density and economic need all demand a thorough reassessment of this industry and its subsidies, community by community. Besides, emerging new economic opportunities are turning logging on its head. An example of what’s coming is illustrated by the March 2022 announcement by Mosaic Forest Management of its “BigCoast Initiative.” (Mosaic is the joint management company that performs certain task for both TimberWest and Island Timberlands, which are two separate corporate entities. TimberWest is owned by the BC Investment Management Corporation and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board. Island Timberlands is owned partly by the BC Investment Management Corporation and partly by its equivalent in Alberta.) Under the BigCoast Initiative, TimberWest will cease logging on approximately 40,000 hectares of its privately-owned forest land on Vancouver Island and Haida Gwaii. Why? Iannidinardo, Mosaic’s chief forester, told The Globe & Mail, “We expect to make at least as much from the BigCoast initiative as we would earn from harvesting these forests.” The BigCoast initiative will sell carbon offsets instead of logging its forests. If it makes more economic sense for TimberWest not to log its own property, then surely it makes just as much sense for the ministry of forests to stop logging public land on the Discovery Islands, too. No matter what you think about “carbon offsets,” Mosaic’s direction reflects a new understanding that forests have a crucial role to play in mitigating climate change. A paradigm shift in the human-forest relationship is already underway. The role the Discovery Islands Forest Conservation Project will play in that shift will be to gather and curate accurate information about the forests on each of the Discovery Islands, and present ideas and opportunities that reflect the need for greater conservation of those forests.
  4. The 2001 Vancouver Island Land Use Plan, which included Quadra Island, was a decade in the making and was supposed to resolve conflicts on publicly owned land between logging and other values. An example of how the objectives of that planning have been undermined is illustrated by the logging of old forest at Hummingbird Lake. IN JULY 2019, on a hike just east of Newton Lake on Quadra Island, my wife and I came across a logging operation on the north side of Hummingbird Lake. It was a Sunday, and work was paused. From previous visits to Hummingbird Lake and from research on where past logging has occurred on Quadra, I knew this was what is known as “primary” forest: no roads had ever been built and there had been no previous logging. Such areas—undisturbed by industrial activity—are now exceedingly rare in places that have significant human populations living nearby, including Quadra Island. The old-growth forest contained many large, veteran Douglas firs that had survived previous natural disturbances, including 1925’s large fire that burned much of Quadra Island with varying intensity. Since that fire, a mix of hemlock and fir had grown back between the big, old Douglas firs, which had continued to thrive. This forest is in the CWHxm2 biogeoclimatic zone and, coast-wide, the remaining old-growth forest in this zone is at 9 percent. Below 10 percent, forest ecologists say, biodiversity is at high risk. The logging road Okisollo Resources punched through an old-growth forest north of Hummingbird Lake in 2019 Finding a logging operation in this extraordinary place was disappointing. This was exactly the type of forest that was supposed to have been left undisturbed under the provisions of the 2001 Vancouver Island Land Use Plan’s Higher Level Plan Order. Quadra Island had been included in that ground-breaking attempt to end the heated conflict on Vancouver Island between logging and other values. One of those values was conservation of biodiversity. In Quadra’s case, the VILUP gave biodiversity conservation a higher priority than timber extraction. And that boiled down to protecting the remaining old-growth forest (>250 years old) and managing logging so that there would always be at least 25 percent of the area covered with mature forest (>80 years old). The fact that Quadra Island was the only non-Vancouver Island area to have been selected for a Special Management Zone is testimony to the land use planners’ understanding—25 years ago—of the high level of non-timber values present in Quadra Island’s forests, and the strong interest in the community to protect those values. On the day I visited the site, the logging company, Okisollo Resources of Ladysmith, were in the process of cutting the younger hemlock and fir that had grown up since the 1925 fire. Except for some old-growth felled to build the logging road, the old firs still stood. The operation seemed poised to take out everything but the old fir vets, a practice that has been employed throughout SMZ 19 by TimberWest to meet the old-forest obligations of SMZ 19. The old-growth forest in the midst of being logged by Okisollo Resources This practice—cutting between the old trees—doesn’t actually protect biodiversity, according to forest ecologist Rachael Holt, even though that is the intent of the old-forest provisions for SMZ 19. But it appeared that Okisollo Resources was, like TimberWest, going to leave most of the big firs—about 50 of them remained—spread over a 3-hectare cutblock. I estimated another 5 to 10 had already been cut to build the roads. That many old firs on that small area is as dense as any old-growth stand I have ever found on Quadra Island. About a month later, I was able to obtain a satellite image that seemed to confirm that Okisollo had left the veteran firs. It showed most of the big trees not in the roadways—now about 45 of them—had been left. In the satellite image below, the west end of Hummingbird Lake is visible at the bottom. This beautiful little lake is a short distance east of Small Inlet Provincial Park and close to the southern edge of Octopus Islands Provincial Park. Neither of those parks has a comparably-sized area of old-growth forest within its boundaries. Satellite image of Okisollo Resources cutblock just north of Hummingbird Lake, on Quadra Island, in August 2019 RETURNING TO THE SITE about 9 months later, we found that all but 5 of the old Douglas fir vets in the cutblock had been felled. A number of big logs still lay beside the road. The growth rings of one of those showed it had been about 370 years old when cut. The tight-grained log was sound and appeared to be high quality wood. The Ministry of Forests’ Harvest Billing System, which records the volume logged and the stumpage paid for trees cut on Crown land, shows that Okisollo Resources likely paid about $3800 in total stumpage for the 50-or-so old-growth Douglas fir trees it felled in August of 2019. That’s roughly $75 per tree. Those trees definitely met the ministry’s definition of “old” (greater than 250 years of age) and, under the provisions and intentions of SMZ 19, should have been left standing. View of the cutblock at Hummingbird Lake in June 2020. This is the same area as is shown in the drone photograph at the top of this page, which shows the abundant wood left in the cutblock. Logs left behind by Okisollo Resources showed the old-growth had been around 370 years old The requirements for biodiversity conservation stipulated for SMZ 19 were that at least 9 percent of the entire area of Okisollo’s Woodlot Licence tenure should be left as old forest (greater than 250 years of age), and at least 25 percent of the area would be covered with “mature” (greater than 80 years of age) forest. These were the levels of old and mature forest for areas where an “intermediate” level of biodiversity conservation was the objective. Okisollo’s Woodlot Licence tenure was one of the few areas on Quadra Island where the “at least 9 percent” might have been achieved. Given the history of extensive logging on Quadra Island since 1880, establishment of SMZ 19 meant conserving all remaining old forest since less than 10 percent of the area in the zone is covered by old-growth. The specific strategy to reach the required percentages of old forest and mature forest recommended by the Vancouver Island Land Use Plan for Quadra Island was to “maintain existing old forest in the zone, as well as second growth with [a] high portion of veteran trees...” That was the strategy that extensive land use planning had determined should be applied to the 3 hectares where Okisollo Resources had just cut about 50-60 large, old Douglas firs and all of the younger trees between them. But since SMZ 19 was created in 2001, the Campbell River District office of the Ministry of Forests had slowly but surely introduced more and more Woodlot Licence Program tenures into the zone, a form of tenure that is immune to the objectives for old and mature forest established by the Vancouver Island Land Use Plan. There are now 11 Woodlot Licence tenures in SMZ 19, occupying roughly half of the zone—each of them virtually free to ignore the requirements established by the plan. Okisollo Resources was granted such a tenure in 2010, 9 years after SMZ 19 had been created and 6 years after regulations for Woodlot Licence tenures had been rewritten so that they didn’t have to meet government objectives for old and mature forest. This repeated location of Woodlot Licence tenures in a Special Management Zone has the appearance of the Ministry of Forests intentionally undoing land-use planning. Following our discovery that Hummingbird forest had been felled, I filed a freedom of information request for the record of communications between the Ministry of Forests and the forester responsible for the planning and approval of this cutblock. I have often heard the logging industry claim that a company has to satisfy dozens of stringent regulations before it can cut old-growth forest. This seemed the perfect opportunity to find out what those regulations were. The records provided by the ministry showed that the company’s forester—who is also a principal of Okisollo Resources—advised the ministry in an emailed “notice of commencement” that, “There are scattered [fir] vets in the block, as well as evidence of fire.” The forester also provided a brief description of the ecological community in the understory. The response from the ministry was: “Thank you for the NOC. Please be advised that in order for me to add the cut blocks to Woodlot CPs; you need to send the following information (as noted below) which shows both Gross & NAR hectares.” That was it. There was no information exchanged between the ministry official and the company forester that would have allowed the ministry to assess whether “scattered vets” might actually be a rare stand of old forest adjacent to two provincial parks that had next to no old forest themselves. All that mattered to the ministry was the gross area that would be cut. The biodiversity and other objectives stipulated for SMZ 19—and for all the other 20 0r so SMZs scattered around Vancouver Island—are still legally in effect. In 2021, the Forest Practices Board reported on a complaint regarding logging by BC Timber Sales in SMZ 13, which is in the Nahmint Valley on Vancouver Island. In its report, which was critical of BC Timber Sales, the board wrote, “The public needs to be confident that objectives established in land use plans will actually be carried through and implemented in forestry operations.” It is difficult to see how the Quadra public can have confidence that “objectives established in land use plans will actually be carried through and implemented in forestry operations” in SMZ 19. By transferring land in SMZ 19 into the Woodlot Licence Program, the Ministry of Forests was knowingly undoing the protections that had been worked out by 10 years of land-use planning undertaken in concert with the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Mines. Those protections were intended to end “the War in the Woods,” as it was called back then. The Forest Practices Board—the independent watchdog which is supposed to be there for the public interest when logging operations go awry of regulations—has recently confirmed that it isn’t going to do anything to rectify the problem on Quadra Island. Soon after my second visit to Hummingbird Lake, Quadra Island resident Rod Burns filed a complaint with the Forest Practices Board, raising the issue of Okisollo Resources cutting old forest. The Board undertook an investigation; in June 2022, the board issued its findings. The report stated, in short, that Okisollo Resources had complied with “legal requirements.” The investigation, however, clearly did not establish the actual facts of the case. The report admitted that no investigators had actually visited the site, yet it authoritatively described the old forest there as “scattered old trees,” just like Okisollo had described it to the ministry. I contacted Forest Practices Board Chair Kevin Kriese following release of the report. Kriese clarified that it was the Board’s understanding that only 10 trees had been cut, a number Okisollo Resources apparently did not disagree with. As mentioned above, however, between 50 and 60 old trees were cut. Without having done an independent on-site assessment of what forest had been there before the logging—easily ascertainable by counting stumps—the Forest Practices Board report lacks credibility. But the Board’s report did contain an interesting paragraph outlining why Woodlot Licence tenures aren’t expected to manage for old growth values and, more importantly, what became of the legal responsibility for meeting the requirements of SMZ 19. It stated: “When members of the BC Legislative Assembly first debated [The Forest and Range Practices Act], the Minister of Forests discussed the exemptions in section 13(3) of FRPA. The Minister explained that it is not practical to regulate old-growth forests on the small scale of a woodlot licence. Instead, government regulates old-growth forest management at the landscape level. For the Quadra landscape unit (Figure 1), which covers the woodlot licence and tree farm licence 47, this means that the holder of the tree farm licence addresses the legal requirements to manage old-growth forests under their forest stewardship plan. Again, the woodlot licensee is exempt from following government’s objectives for the retention of old-growth forests.” There are two things about that statement that I would draw your attention to. First, the Board’s conviction that old and mature forest are being managed on Quadra through the “Quadra landscape unit (Figure 1)”—will be news to the local district office. No such plan exists. It has been promised for many years—a promise going right back to the Vancouver Island Land Use Plan days, but it has never materialized into the public realm. Second, the Forest Practices Board report puts all of the legal responsibility for ensuring that the provisions for old and mature forest in SMZ 19 are met on TFL 47—which is tenured to TimberWest (aka “Mosaic Forest Management”). The physical area of SMZ 19 is exactly the same now as it was in 2001—approximately 16,000 hectares. But now, instead of the requirement for managing for old and mature forest being spread over the entire area of SMZ 19, that responsibility now falls entirely on about half of the original area of SMZ 19, the area occupied by TFL 47. It has been pointed out to TimberWest that if the entire legal responsibility for providing the spatial requirements for old and mature forest falls to them, they are almost out of room to log on Quadra Island. TimberWest’s response has been to claim that it will “coordinate” with the Woodlot Licence tenures to ensure the requirements of SMZ 19 are met. Does this make sense in terms of protecting the public interest? No, of course not. Such “coordination” would require, as TimberWest has admitted, that TimberWest negotiate with some of the other Woodlot Licence tenure holders to put some of their old and mature forest in permanent reserve so that TimberWest could keep cutting on TFL 47. But that would only happen, of course, if some entity existed that could reliably ensure such legal agreements were actually made and were enforced. The Ministry of Forests, obviously, has no interest in seeing such an agreement in place. Its actions over a number of years precipitated this bizarre, unworkable situation in the first place. It will take concerted public involvement and vigilance to ensure that the minimal biodiversity conservation provisions set up for Special Management Zone 19 are implemented. While were at it, it’s time to raise the level of biodiversity conservation from “Intermediate”—as set out for SMZ 19—to “High.” That would be more in tune with what we now know about the collapse in biodiversity and the need to conserve forests to mitigate climate change.
  5. Over the past 20 years, BC forests were so heavily logged that net carbon emissions caused by the industry are now twice as large as Alberta’s oil sands. AT THE HEIGHT OF LAST SUMMER'S ECONOMIC MELTDOWN in the BC interior’s forest industry, Marty Gibbons, president of United Steelworkers Local 1-417, based in Kamloops, told the Canadian Press: “Something needs to change immediately or these small communities that don’t have other employers are going to wither and die.” Gibbons concluded that “the largest driving factor is the Province’s complex stumpage system that results in high fees.” The average stumpage rate in BC—the price the Province charges forestry companies for harvesting a cubic metre of tree on Crown land—was around $23 for both the interior and the coast in 2019 (1). But the average stumpage paid for timber harvested from Crown land by major raw log exporters like TimberWest and Western Forest Products in the Campbell River Natural Resource District was much lower, ranging between $8 and $11 per cubic metre. Smaller companies paid even less—as little as $5 per cubic metre. Yet raw logs for export were selling at an average price of $128 per cubic metre through 2019 (2). Raw logs worth $4.146 billion were exported from BC to other countries for processing over the past five years (3). This huge overcut—unnecessary to meet domestic and international demand for BC’s finished wood products—has averaged 6.5 million cubic metres per year over those five years, equal to 41 percent of the total cut on Crown and private land on the coast (4). So claims that high stumpage rates in BC are the problem that needs to be solved seem out of touch with reality. But Gibbons is still right: something “needs to change immediately.” The required change, however, might be more than what he’s thinking. The interior’s forest industry has been destabilized by two climate-change-related phenomena—devastating wildfire and explosive mountain pine beetle infestation—that have been amplified by the immense extent of BC’s clearcut logging. Gibbons wants to knock a few bucks off the forest companies’ costs so they can run more shifts at the mills. What’s really needed, though, is a much deeper kind of change, one that would quickly transform BC’s forest industry. To start, we need to end the export of raw logs and shift that same volume to a new class of forest: protected forest-carbon reserves. There’s an urgent need to remove carbon from the atmosphere and reduce emissions at the same time. The only way to remove carbon on a large scale and then store it safely for a long time is to not harvest healthy, mature forests of long-lived species. The next 10 years need to be full of bold ideas as we look for and find solutions to the climate crisis. Initiatives like the Carbon Tax in Canada are necessary to disincentivize the use of fossil fuels, but planet Earth isn’t going to give us time to tax our emissions into submission. We need some quick shifts that will cut 10 megatonnes with a few strokes of the Premier’s pen. In BC, protecting the forest instead of destroying it is our only realistic option. If we don’t do this, we’ll run the risk that the rest of the world will start counting the emissions we are releasing from our forests and begin to think of us—and our manufactured wood products industry—as the Brazil of the North. Perhaps what’s required most at this critical moment is recognition by the BC government that an international market for sequestered forest-carbon is coming soon, and that forest companies need to start switching from destroying publicly-owned forests to protecting them. Not just old-growth forests, but mature second-growth stands of long-lived species, too. Forest loss (yellow) on Vancouver Island and the south coast mainland between 2000 and 2018 Source: Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA Our government leaders don’t seem to be thinking straight yet. Instead, deforestation on the BC coast is accelerating. Over the past six years, the area of coastal Crown land that was clearcut increased 16 percent over the previous six-year period. Our provincial forest’s capacity to serve as a carbon sink has vanished. Its catastrophic collapse is recorded in a 20-year segment of the Province’s annual inventory of provincial greenhouse gas emissions. In 1997, BC forests could sequester the equivalent of 103 megatonnes of CO2 annually. By 2017 that had fallen to 19.6 megatonnes (5). From 2020 on, our forests will be a net source of emissions—even without including those from wildfires. The image above shows—in yellow—the physical area of Vancouver Island, and the adjacent mainland coast, that was clearcut between 2000 and 2018. Vancouver Island has become an ecological war zone. But a different economic role for the forest is emerging, one that doesn’t destroy it. That new purpose is highlighted by a gaping hole in Canada’s plan to meet its emissions reduction commitment under the 2015 Paris Agreement. Canada’s 2018 progress report to the UN admits there’s a nearly 100-megatonne gap in the plan to 2030 (and this assumes the rest of the plan will actually work). How will Canada live up to its promise over the next 10 years? The progress report puts it this way: “Potential increases in stored carbon (carbon sequestration) in forests, soils and wetlands will also contribute to reductions which, for a country such as Canada, could also play an important role in achieving the 2030 target.” The report offers no other possibility for filling that gap. Canada, then, will likely depend on using the carbon sequestration capacity of its forests to meet its Paris Agreement commitments. Article 5 of the Paris Agreement encourages all countries to “…promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems.” Depending on how Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is eventually detailed (its development was stymied at the Madrid COP), it’s possible that an international market mechanism for forest carbon is coming, and it can’t come soon enough. The over-exploitation of BC’s forests has added to an explosion in net carbon emissions, delivered to the atmosphere each year by the forest industry’s endless road building and progressive clearcuts. Below, I’ll show why this now amounts to over 190 megatonnes every year (and possibly much more), a far more powerful carbon bomb than is being dropped by Canada’s oil sands industry (6). It’s long past time for us to understand the inner workings of the bomb and to defuse it. There are two separate parts to BC’s bomb, and I will take you through each of these in some detail below. First, when a mature or old forest stand is logged, assuming it’s healthy, the living biomass that’s killed and cut up into small pieces begins a premature process of decay, often hundreds of years before that decay would occur naturally. Secondly, when that mature or old, healthy stand is clearcut, its potential to sequester carbon in the future is lost and it could then take anywhere from 60 years to several hundred years before a new replacement forest could sequester as much carbon as was being stored in the previous stand. Let me take you through the inner workings of each of these parts of BC’s carbon bomb. First, let’s consider the magnitude of the carbon emissions released when wood prematurely decays. Biomass left behind after clearcut logging by Okisollo Resources on Crown land on Quadra Island (Photo by David Broadland) WHEN AN AREA OF FOREST IS CLEARCUT, three decay processes are initiated that result in emissions of carbon to the atmosphere. First, the removal of the trees allows the sun to warm the forest soil to a higher temperature than was possible when it was shaded by trees. That additional warmth speeds up decay processes and the release of greenhouse gases, a process somewhat akin to the melting of permafrost in the Arctic. Soil scientists tell us that forest soil contains even more carbon than all the trees and other biomass that grow in it. Recent studies have reported that as much as 20 percent of the carbon in the layer of soil at the forest floor is released to the atmosphere after an area of forest has been clearcut. This release is a wild card in our emerging understanding of the impact of clearcut logging on carbon emissions. For now it remains unquantified, but it’s definitely not zero. The second decay process begins after an area of forest is clearcut and the unused parts of trees left on the forest floor begin to decay. In his 2019 report Forestry and Carbon in BC (document at end of story), BC forest ecologist Jim Pojar estimated that 40 to 60 percent of the biomass of a forest is left in a clearcut. That includes the branches, stumps, roots, pieces of the stems that shattered when felled, the unutilizable tops of the trees, and unmerchantable trees that are killed in the mayhem of clearcut logging. For our purpose, we will use the mid-point of Pojar’s 40 to 60 percent estimate: half of the biomass is removed, and half remains on the forest floor. The Ministry of Forests’ log scaling system tells us what volume of wood is removed from the forest as merchantable logs. We then assume that an equal volume of wood is left in the clearcut. In 2018, the total volume of wood removed from BC’s forests, as reported in the ministry’s Harvest Billing System, was 54.1 million cubic metres. As per above, we are using the same number for the volume of wood that was left in clearcuts all over the province. So the total volume of wood in play is 108.2 million cubic metres. Both pools of wood—the wood left behind and the wood trucked away—begin to decay after a relatively short period of time following harvest. Each cubic metre of wood will eventually produce about 0.82 tonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions (7). So the wood left behind will produce 44 megatonnes and the wood trucked away will also produce 44 megatonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions—eventually. The average 6.5-million-cubic-metre cut for raw log exports accounts for 11 megatonnes of that 88-megatonne carbon bomb. You might have heard that the carbon in the logs that are harvested and turned into finished wood products will be safely stored in those products indefinitely. But the Ministry of Forests’ own research shows that after 28 years, half of the carbon in the wood products is no longer being safely stored; at 100 years, less than 25 percent of the carbon is still in safe storage (graph below). The rest will have returned to the atmosphere or is headed in that direction. This BC Ministry of Forests graph shows how the carbon stored in wood products declines over time. After 28 years, half of the carbon stored has been lost to the atmosphere. At 100 years, 33 percent remains. BC’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory quantifies the magnitude of the currently acknowledged deterioration of wood products. For 2017 it noted that “Emissions from Decomposition of Harvested Wood Products” contributed 42 megatonnes annually to the provincial greenhouse gas inventory, which is close to our estimate of 44 megatonnes for 2018 (8). For ethical reasons, we ought to attribute all of those future emissions to the year in which the wood was harvested. Note that the period of safe storage of carbon in wood products is much shorter than the expected life of most of the tree species that grow in coastal BC. A Sitka spruce is capable of attaining 700 years of age. Douglas fir commonly reach 600 to 800 years of age, and have been known to survive to 1000 years. Red cedar can reach even greater longevity. The Cheewat Lake Cedar near Clo-oose has been estimated to be as old as 2,500 years. The coastal forest’s longevity—compared with BC’s interior forests—arises, in part, because the coast’s wetter climate lowers the incidence of drought and wildfires that could kill the forest. As well, there are no mountain pine beetles in coastal BC. By eliminating the export of raw logs and instead protecting an equivalent volume of long-lived coastal stands each year, 11 megatonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions could be avoided. That would be a much more substantial reduction in provincial emissions than, for example, the BC Carbon Tax has produced after 10 years. The author measures the circumference (27 feet) of an apparently healthy 700-800-year-old Douglas fir on Quadra Island. Douglas fir are known to live for as long as 1000 years. THE SECOND PART OF THE BOMB—the loss of sequestration capacity—is a measure of the net growth, per year, of the carbon stored by our forests. Provincial data shows that sequestration capacity held steady at about 103 megatonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions per year between 1990 and 1999, and then began to decline through to 2017, the last year for which data is available. But the rate of decline suggests that our forests are now a net source of emissions, even without including the emissions released as a result of natural disturbances such as wildfires. The impact on climate stability of BC’s forests losing the ability to absorb 103 megatonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions per year is no different than the impact of releasing 103 megatonnes of CO2-equivalent emissions every year. Let me give you just a glimpse of how unbridled logging has reduced sequestration capacity. Consider the impact of logging roads. Logging in BC has required the construction of a vast and very expensive network of industrial-duty roads that have gouged out an equally vast area of previously productive forest and covered it over with blasted rock and gravel. The public has paid for these roads through reduced stumpage payments. They’re poor, if not impossible places for trees to grow. In BC, logging roads and landings are allowed to occupy up to seven percent of the area of a cutblock. As well, to avoid slash burning, the unmarketable wood left in a clearcut is increasingly consolidated in semi-permanent piles that, like the roads and landings, reduce the space available for a new forest to grow. A recent report at The Narwhal by Sarah Cox described a study in Ontario that examined the extent of such forest loss in that province. Cox reported that researchers there found “logging scars created by roads and landings…occupied an average of 14.2 percent of the area logged.” So our province’s seven percent restriction could well be an underestimation of the forest base that’s being lost. But let’s use seven percent and calculate how much forest has been lost. Sierra BC’s recent report, Clearcut Carbon (document at end of story), put the total area logged in BC between 2005 and 2017 at 3,597,291 hectares, which included private land on Vancouver Island. If seven percent of that area was covered with roads and landings, the area of forest lost over that 13-year period would be 251,810 hectares. That’s larger than Vancouver Island’s largest protected area, Strathcona Park. In this randomly selected, typical aerial view of Crown forest on Quadra Island, the permanent, ballasted logging roads occupy 8.2 percent of the area of the recent clearcuts. Sierra BC chose a 13-year period for its report because it takes at least 13 years after a clearcut has been replanted for the area to shift from being a source of carbon emissions to a carbon sink. The report grimly observed: “For at least 13 years, these areas are ‘sequestration dead zones’: clearcut lands that emit more carbon than they absorb.” In the case of roads, though, the forest land they now occupy has become a permanent just-plain-dead zone, and another one the size of Strathcona Park is being created every 13 years. While the blame for BC’s forests becoming a net source of carbon emissions has been directed at non-human causes like the mountain pine beetle and wildfires, the forest industry’s production of 251, 810 hectares of just-plain-dead zones and 3.6 million hectares of sequestration dead zones every 13 years is pushing ecological stability to the brink. Once upon a time, management of BC’s forests was based on the concept of “sustained yield.” It was a commonly held belief of residents of this province that this meant the annual allowable cut was restricted to no more than the amount of new forest growth each year. Many of us, including myself, have mistakenly believed that approach to managing the public forests was how the Forest Service still operated. This is clearly not the case. The Forest Service has turned the resource into an annual carbon bomb that has become one of the largest carbon emitters/carbon-sink killers in Canada. At more than 190 megatonnes a year (88 from premature decay emissions and 103 from loss of the forest-carbon sink), it’s well over twice the size of emissions from Canadian oil sands operations and three times the rest of BC’s emissions. Yet we cut far more than we need for our own use. That’s just plain nuts. The most obvious starting point for repairing BC’s broken forest-carbon sink would be to ban the export of raw logs. That would make it possible to put the 6.5 million cubic metres of trees that weren’t harvested into a protected carbon reserve each year until the provincial forest-carbon sink has been rebuilt to at least 1997’s level: 103 megatonnes per year. YOU MIGHT THINK THAT THE GREATEST CHALLENGE to eliminating raw log exports and putting that uncut volume into protected carbon reserves would be the huge loss in employment that would result. You’d be wrong. There were 17,800 people employed in “forestry and logging with support activities” in all of BC in 2018, according to BC Stats (9). This figure doesn’t include BC’s wood products manufacturing jobs, but eliminating log exports wouldn’t affect those jobs since raw log exports create zero manufacturing jobs in BC. 2018 was a very good year for employment in the forest industry. The total volume cut in BC forests, including on both public and private land, was 54.1 million cubic metres. Of that, 30 percent was cut on the coast and 70 percent in the interior. Based on that split, about 30 percent of the employment in “forestry and logging with support activities” was on the coast, or about 5340 jobs. In 2018, raw log exports were at a five-year low of 5.03 million cubic metres, equivalent to 31 percent of the coastal cut. So eliminating log exports that year would have eliminated about 31 percent of those 5340 coastal logging jobs, or 1650 jobs. It would have also eliminated, or at least greatly delayed, 8.3 megatonnes of emissions. To put those 1650 jobs in perspective, they represented less than one-tenth of one percent of BC’s total workforce in 2018. They are amongst the most carbon-emission-intensive jobs on Earth. In the approaching low-carbon economy, employment will need to shift from carbon-emission-intensive to carbon-absorption-intensive. Any job that is part of a low-cost process for removing carbon from the atmosphere is going to be in demand. Allowing trees to grow is currently the lowest-cost process for absorbing carbon from the atmosphere. This is unlikely to change. When BC starts to put thousands of hectares of forest land into carbon sequestration reserves each year, optimizing the amount of carbon stored will require scientists, surveyors, mappers, planners, foresters, tree planters, thinners, pruners, salvagers and fire suppressors. It’s likely to include some selection logging. If anything, optimizing the forests’ capacity for sequestration is likely to require more workers than are provided by road building and the mechanized form of clearcutting widely practiced on the coast. Where would the money for all this employment come from? The Carbon Tax is slated to rise to $50 per tonne in 2021. If the 5-year-average export cut was ended and the trees left standing, a net reduction in emissions of 11 megatonnes would have an annual value of $550 million. That’s a lot more than necessary to keep 1650-2000 jobs in a transformative BC Forest-Carbon Service. Do the arithmetic yourself. David Broadland is exploring the potential for conserving selected BC forests for carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and short-distance tourism potential. He welcomes your feedback. Forestry and Carbon In BC by Dr. Jim Pojar: Forestry and Carbon in BC Dr. Jim Pojar.pdf3.51 MB · 49 downloads Clearcut Carbon by Sierra BC: 2019-Clearcut-Carbon-report.pdf2.14 MB · 35 downloads Edited January 7 by admin
  6. If history repeats itself, local plans to reduce GHG emissions will come up far short of targets. Shouldn’t there be a Plan B? IS THE APPROACH TAKEN BY Victoria and Saanich to reduce GHG emissions within their jurisdictions flawed in some fundamental way that guarantees little or no reduction? This is a vital question to consider. Almost all local governments in the CRD have recently declared a “Climate Emergency,” yet the best local example of a well-considered climate action plan—put in place ten years ago by Saanich—has produced only a small reduction in emissions. If the action plans local governments are creating are just more of the same approach Saanich has already tried—and they are—why would the result be any different? In 2008, during a previous peak in public interest and concern about global climate change, the BC government introduced North America’s first broad-based carbon tax. At the same time, the municipality of Saanich began drafting a plan to reduce territorial sector-based GHG emissions. By 2010, Saanich had launched its forward-thinking “Climate Action Plan.” One of the plan’s primary goals was an “at least 33 percent” reduction in territorial emissions from 2007 levels by 2020. Ten years later, how did that go? Back in 2010, Saanich’s Climate Action Plan put the municipality’s 2007 sector-based territorial GHG emissions at 521,000 tonnes per year. What are they now? In 2019, after declaring a Climate Emergency, the municipality quickly developed the outline (see document 1 at end of this story) of a new climate action plan that plotted a pathway to reduce sector-based territorial emissions by 50 percent by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Saanich’s new starting point, according to that outline, would be 512,900 tonnes. So nearly 10 years after launching its 2010 action plan, Saanich’s sector-based territorial emissions are only 8,100 tonnes below 2007 levels. That works out to a 1.6 percent reduction, well within the uncertainty associated with the accuracy of the 2007 estimate of emissions. Why does Saanich now expect a different result on its second try using the same approach? Victoria is using the same methodology in its Climate Leadership Plan (see document 2). “Pathways to 2050 GHG Reduction Targets” from the City of Victoria's Climate Leadership Plan. Plotting points on a graph has been tried before. According to the climate action plans for both communities, all that residents need to do is summed up in three initiatives: First, property owners need to get rid of their oil and natural gas heating and hot water systems and buy electric heat pumps. Second, car drivers need to switch to a bicycle, an electric bus, or an electric car. Third, Victoria and Saanich foresee the availability of “renewable natural gas,” although it’s uncertain where that will come from and how much such facilities would cost, both in dollars and embodied emissions. But residents should get ready to pay for it. All of these provisions require new consumption: of electric cars and bicycles, new heating systems, new infrastructure to create biogas, and probably new offices to house a growing contingent of Climate Emergency managers. We just need to buy our way to lower emissions. While the experience of Saanich’s 10-year-long unsuccessful attempt at lowering emissions should provide local governments with ample warning that it’s far easier to plot reductions on paper than to achieve them in the real world, there are other reasons to doubt substantial reductions will ever materialize. One example: neither community has any intention of constraining population growth or the gentrification of existing neighbourhoods. Thus, we will continue to see, as long as the Canadian economy is growing, new buildings and infrastructure created to service a growing population, and neighbourhoods becoming increasingly affluent and filled with bigger, more luxurious homes. Such growth comes with immense embodied emissions, and some of what’s being created right now is surprisingly energy-inefficient. In the City of Victoria, much of the growth is in the form of concrete and glass condominium highrises in the Downtown core. While emissions reduction planners might think that such modern buildings will be energy efficient, BC Hydro doesn’t. In High-Powered Highrise, a report released earlier this year, Hydro noted: “Despite the suites in newer high-rise buildings often being marketed as energy-efficient and including things like LED lighting and Energy Star® appliances, the combined electricity usage of the overall building is approximately two times more than high-rises built in the 1980s, and almost four times more than low-rise buildings built that same decade.” Why? According to BC Hydro, “This increase can largely be attributed to these newer, high-rise condo buildings (those with five stories or more) being equipped with high consuming luxury amenities, including pools, hot tubs, party rooms and fitness centres.” The strong desire for a luxurious home is also evident in many new low-rise multi-unit buildings in Victoria and Saanich. The market for luxury, it turns out, is a far more powerful determinant of what gets built than concerns about energy efficiency or carbon emissions, even in the midst of a Climate Emergency. The relentless demolition of perfectly useable smaller, older homes, which are then replaced with high-end single-family homes two or three times the size, doesn’t support the Climate Emergency managers’ expectation, which underpins their emission-reduction targets, that consumers of housing are seriously concerned about either energy or material conservation. The absence of any measures in their climate action plans to constrain population increase and physical growth in Victoria and Saanich isn’t the only reason to doubt real reductions in carbon emissions will be achieved. The most serious problem with both action plans is that they only address a small fraction of the emissions that Victoria and Saanich create, or cause to be released somewhere else. Civic governments count their emissions using what is known as “sector-based territorial emissions accounting.” In developing their climate action plans, both Saanich and Victoria have identified emissions created by the burning of fossil fuels, or the release of methane, within their boundaries using four sector-based GHG inventories: transportation (automobiles and buses), stationary energy (which includes, for example, all energy related to buildings), industrial products and processes (for example the City’s asphalt plant) and waste (solid waste, sewage, composting). Both Saanich and Victoria are acting in accordance with what is known as the Global Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories (GPC) and their methodology aligns with the guidelines of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Using this protocol, Victoria identified 387,694 tonnes of territorial carbon emissions; as mentioned above, Saanich estimated 512,900 tonnes. The two communities’ analyses of territorial emissions yield similar per capita levels: 4.52 tonnes per person in Victoria and 4.8 tonnes per person in Saanich. Both these numbers, though, are far lower than the known per capita emissions of Canadians, which were 19.6 tonnes per person in 2017. Saanich and Victoria, then, have set their sights on addressing less than 25 percent of our known per capita emissions. Where do the other 75 percent of Canada’s per capita emissions come from? About 26 percent of emissions come from the oil and gas industries, releases that occur before their end-products reach consumers. Another 10 percent comes from heavy industry (fertilizers, iron and steel, cement, aluminum, and pulp and paper). The vast majority of the remaining 64 percent of emissions are created by the production and use of housing, transportation, and goods and services consumed by Canadians in their daily lives. Because 85 percent of Canadians live in cities, most of this consumption occurs in urban centres like Victoria. So cities, and how their governments approach emissions reduction, will have a large impact on whether Canada’s response to the Climate Emergency is effective or not. It’s only been in the last couple of years that comprehensive attempts have been made to quantify all the carbon emissions that human activity in cities creates directly or causes to be released elsewhere. Research done by the international organization C40 Cities provides some valuable insight. C40 Cities describes itself as “a network of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate change.” Its board includes such climate luminaries as former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and current Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo. Vancouver is participating in the initiative. C40 Cities has developed an alternative emissions accounting approach that focuses on the consumption of goods and services by residents of a city. In this approach, GHG emissions are reported by consumption category rather than GHG emission source category. The 12 categories of consumption C40 Cities uses (and the percentage each category adds to emissions in a North American city) are: capital (15.3 percent); utilities and housing (26 percent); food, beverage and tobacco (7 percent); public transport (10.2 percent); private transport (7.3 percent); government (9.5 percent); clothing, furnishing and household equipment (8.8 percent); restaurants, hotels, recreation and culture (7.2 percent); communications (2.7 percent); education and health (3 percent); miscellaneous goods and services (1 percent); and “other” (2 percent). A C40 Cities study (see document 3), released in March 2018, noted that “consumption-based GHG emissions of C40 cities are significant, and significantly larger than sector-based GHG emissions established using the GPC.” How much larger? The C40 study found that “16 cities, mostly in Europe and North America, have consumption-based GHG emissions at least three times the size of their sector-based GHG emissions.” Although Victoria and Saanich weren’t part of this study, it’s not unreasonable to surmise that consumption-based emissions here are also “at least three times the size” of the sector-based emissions used by Victoria and Saanich in their climate action plans. It should be noted that Saanich commissioned a study of its 2015 consumption-based emissions. That report was released in 2018. It concluded that consumption-based emissions were two times higher than emissions based on sector-based accounting. The study did not include several of the categories C40 Cities uses, including “government services.” Let me give you just a few examples of emissions not counted by Victoria or Saanich in their sector-based territorial accounting that would be counted in consumption-based accounting. Emissions associated with the cement used in concrete for constructing buildings, foundations, sidewalks, retaining walls, overpasses, etc, are not counted because the cement is manufactured elsewhere. So, too, is the steel rebar used to reinforce this concrete. Saanich has an aggregate mine that provides the sand and gravel used in concrete, but Victoria doesn’t. Thus no emissions related to producing and transporting the ingredients of the concrete in Victoria’s downtown highrise boom are included in its territorial accounting of emissions. Another example is “government services.” While both Victoria and Saanich do count GHG emissions caused directly by the burning of fuels resulting from their own operations, they don’t include the carbon emissions embodied in the more than $500 million in funding the two governments collect each year from residential, institutional and business taxpayers. There are no lumber or plywood mills in Victoria or Saanich, so none of the emissions or loss of forest carbon sinks associated with the forest industry and its products are included in municipal accounts of emissions, even though these products are essential for the physical growth and maintenance of our homes, hospitals, schools, and places of business. Nor do Saanich or Victoria count the emissions created when their residents fly, for business or pleasure, to Vancouver, Paris—or wherever. Although a small amount of the food we consume is grown here, most is grown elsewhere and transported to the island. Virtually none of the emissions embodied in our food is counted by Victoria or Saanich. Missing from their tallies, too, are the emissions embodied in the cellphones, computers, flat-screen TVs and other electronic devices manufactured elsewhere but consumed widely by Victoria businesses, institutions and households. I won’t go on. You get the idea. In Saanich and Victoria, Climate Emergency managers are counting only a small fraction of the GHG emissions that households, businesses, institutions and governments here are actually causing, directly or indirectly, to be released into the atmosphere. Using C40 Cities’ “at least three times” multiplier, a more realistic estimate of the City of Victoria’s emissions would be 1.2 megatonnes per year. Let’s put Saanich down for 1.5 megatonnes. Obviously, local climate action plans will have no success at reducing emissions that they’re not even acknowledging or targetting. Focus editor Leslie Campbell admires a carbon sequestration facility on Quadra Island (Photo by David Broadland IS THERE A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION that municipal governments could take to mitigate their emissions? Yes, there is. In a written response (document 1) to Saanich council’s declaration of a Climate Emergency, Manager of Sustainability Ting Pan noted there were two ways to achieve carbon neutrality. The first was to eliminate carbon emissions completely. The second was to “balance carbon emissions with carbon removal.” By “carbon removal,” Pan meant the sequestration of carbon by trees. The simplest form of this approach to mitigate emissions, known as “offsets,” is available to a person making a trip by airplane. Payment of an additional small fee—which, the offsetting company promises, will go towards planting a seedling somewhere on the planet—helps to expunge feelings of guilt and shame that some people experience when boarding an airplane. But this form of offsetting has been widely criticized, and rightly so. Forest scientists tell us (document 4), for example, that it takes about 17 years after a coastal BC clearcut has been replanted (which is often delayed several years after harvesting) to switch from being a source of carbon emissions to being a carbon sink. So offsetters that promise to plant a tree to mitigate emissions from, say, your flight to Stuttgart or Calgary, have no immediate effect on reducing atmospheric carbon. Moreover, if trees planted for offsets are cut down in 30 or 40 years, and that low-quality juvenile wood is then used for some short-lived product like shipping pallets or pulp for paper or biofuel, most of the carbon that tree stored is quickly released to the atmosphere. But there’s another possibility for using carbon removal, and this would be similar to that developed for the Great Bear Rainforest, which protects mainly old-growth forest. If second-growth trees on the south coast of British Columbia that are slated to be logged (and all Crown land currently under forestry tenures is slated to be logged, eventually) were left to grow, they would sequester more and more carbon each year for a few hundred years. If they were left until they get very old—a Douglas-fir tree, for example, can reach 1000 years of age or more—they would sequester large amounts of carbon over long periods of time. Saanich’s Ting Pan put the current cost of offsets at $25 per tonne. At that rate, to offset Saanich’s estimated 1.5 megatonnes of consumption-based emissions for a year would cost about $38 million, and Victoria’s 1.2 megatonnes would cost $30 million a year. Ting Pan noted that, while “carbon removal” was “theoretically possible,” there is “no known precedence of any Canadian municipalities taking this approach to become a carbon neutral community.” She added that such offsets “will have to be generated outside of Saanich’s municipal boundary…and would likely contribute to global emissions reduction. However, purchasing offsets have limited direct benefits to local residents, businesses or the local environments.” That last statement is ironic, and I’ll explain the irony later. But the only alternative to a “carbon removal” approach is to repeat the actions Saanich took starting in 2010—an approach that hasn’t proven effective and addresses only a third or less of the actual emissions it should. It seems doomed to fail. In a Climate Emergency, shouldn’t our governments be trying out different options to see what works best? THE RISK THAT CIVIC CLIMATE ACTION PLANS WILL FAIL to deliver significant reductions in community-based emissions demands a Plan B for insurance. Certain species of trees, like Douglas fir, Western red cedar and Sitka spruce, can store atmospheric carbon for several hundred, even thousands of years. Forest scientists tell us that coastal old-growth forests store from 750 to 1130 tonnes of carbon per hectare, all absorbed from the atmosphere over the centuries. Our coastal rainforests can contain twice as much carbon per hectare as tropical rainforests like those in the Amazon jungle. While old-growth forests around the Salish Sea are becoming increasingly rare, second-growth forests that have a high percentage of Douglas fir, with trees up to 80 years old, are, by comparison, widespread. Select areas of the coast that measure high for biodiversity, tourism and recreation potential, and have the capacity for growing large Douglas fir, cedar or Sitka spruce, could be set aside and managed for optimal carbon sequestration. This wouldn’t mean an end to forestry jobs in these selected areas, but clear-cut logging would end. This approach is already being employed with old growth in the Great Bear Rainforest by the First-Nations-operated Great Bear Carbon Credit Corporation. Second-growth forests on Crown land like those on Sonora Island (left) and Maurelle Island (right) are slated for clear-cutting. Municipal governments could conserve these areas’ biodiversity, tourism potential, and carbon sequestration capacity by paying fees to offset their own communities’ GHG emissions. (Photograph by David Broadland) The Crown-owned second-growth forests around the Salish Sea could absorb many millions of tonnes of carbon from the atmosphere and store that carbon for several hundred years. But they are being clear-cut at an unsustainably high rate, and their potential for storing carbon is rapidly being lost. Tragically, these second-growth forests are being harvested at an age when they are just beginning to absorb carbon at the highest rate per year, a pace that would continue for another 100 to 200 years if left to grow. Through a combination of government shortsightedness and mechanized-forestry corporate greed, BC is losing one of the most effective tools available on the planet for removing carbon from the atmosphere. Some of the loss is justifiable to the extent that lumber is necessary for building housing in BC. A substantial portion of that loss, however, is being exported as raw logs, which provides minimal economic benefit for coastal residents. Ironically, most of the rapid liquidation of both old-growth and second-growth forests on Vancouver Island and the northern Gulf Islands is being carried out by TimberWest and Island Timberlands, both of which are owned, to a large extent, by public service pension funds that provide many former government (federal, provincial and municipal) employees with good pensions. Many of these former civil servants have retired to the Victoria area. The community benefits greatly by their presence here, but some of that economic benefit has come at the cost of widespread environmental damage caused by logging of both old-growth and second-growth forests. The south coast is not just losing the potential for carbon sequestration; logging-road construction and clearcutting are blasting, filling and shredding wildlife habitat, diminishing biodiversity and the land’s ability to store water. Can municipal governments step forward and preserve carbon sinks as an insurance policy against the potential failure of their climate action plans to perform as needed? Saanich’s Ting Pan, as noted above, wrote that, “purchasing offsets have limited direct benefits to local residents, businesses or the local environments.” The irony in that assessment is that local residents and businesses have already benefitted—through money that has flowed into this community from those public service pension plans and increased government revenues—from the destruction of forest-based carbon sinks that is occurring all around the Salish Sea. HOW MIGHT THE COST of protecting the remaining old growth and selected areas of second growth be charged against consumption-based emissions in communities like Victoria and Saanich? Households would pay a fee, based on household income, to municipal governments. Municipalities would transfer that money to the Province. The Province would then allocate funds to those affected resource communities selected for carbon sequestration projects to transition them away from timber extraction on Crown land and towards carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, and development of tourism/recreation/research infrastructure. Why should Saanich and Victoria collect carbon sequestration fees based on household income? A new scientific study (see document 5) on consumption-based household GHG emissions provides evidence for what most people already know: The greater the household income, the higher its consumption-based emissions. This peer-reviewed research quantifies the substantial difference in emissions between low-income and high-income households in the US. Canadians and Americans have very similar per capita GHG emissions, so the data from this new study is useful in Canada. The numbers suggest that Canadian households with incomes of $150,000 have consumption-based annual emissions of about 56 tonnes; a household income of $100,000 produces 50 tonnes; $60,000 in household income produces 33 tonnes; and $30,000 in income produces 22 tonnes. At Tang’s estimate of $25 per tonne to offset emissions, a household with $60,000 in income would pay an annual emissions offset fee of $825. A household with $150,000 in income would pay $1400. If Victoria’s or Saanich’s Climate Emergency managers could prove that their action plans had reduced community emissions by, say, five percent, then their residents’ fees could be reduced by five percent, or whatever reduction had been achieved. If emissions go up, the fees go up, and more forest land is converted to carbon reserve. As Saanich’s Ting Pan noted, “there is no known precedence of any Canadian municipalities taking this approach to become a carbon neutral community.” There’s also no known example in Canada of a municipal climate action plan producing significant emission reductions. Such plans are often branded to include the word “leadership.” Victoria has called its plan the “Climate Leadership Plan.” But can following a path that’s known to badly underestimate actual emissions, and which uses an approach that has already proven itself to be ineffective, be regarded as “leadership”? David Broadland is the publisher of Focus. He is working with a group of scientists, journalists and citizens to explore the potential for conserving selected BC forests for carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and short-distance tourism potential.
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